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Preface
This report is based on a review of literature focusing on the development of
Botswana since independence in 1966. Commssioned by the Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs as an input to a proposed study on. the. impact of aid on
Botswana, the objective of this review has been to identify the commonly held
views and interpretations among the many observers of Botswana's development.
It follows, that the report does not present an analytical perspective of its own. It is
a summar, to the best of our abilty, of a broad range of scholarly work
characterising and explaining what has generally been labelled a development
success story. We believe the perspectives and findings of the varous authors
consulted have been duly recognised.
Ideally, a literature survey should be a review of most that is written on the
subject. With respect to Botswana's development history, that has been an
insurmountable task given the extraordinar volume of literature. To overcome
time limits and meet realistic demands, we have had to make some choices.
Thematically, we have limited our survey to debates pertaining to the political and
economic development after independence in 1966 and only to a limited extent
consulted historical sources. The review is further mainly based on internationally
published monographs, anthologies and artic1es. So called "grey documents"
authored by either Botswana or other international government sources have been
treated more sporadically, as it was not possible within the time limits to establish
a comprehensive knowledge of the entire volume of grey documents. This was
paricularly diffcult as the section on aid should cover international aid, not only
Norwegian bilateral aid. An additional reason for focusing on the internationally
published sources is that it appears that much of this literature is not easily
obtainable in Botswana.
In a separate report we present a bibliography of the literature we have identified
as paricularly relevant in any follow-up study on impact of aid.
When Botswana's vice-president Mr. Festus G. Mogae visited Norway in the
summer of 1995, both the Norwegian and Botswana authorities indicated an
interest in analysing the wider impacts of aid following 30 years of international
development assistance to Botswana of which Norway has been a major
contributor.
Indeed, Botswana's special status as a continuous growth economy and pluralist
democracy may in itself justify a study. However, in its 30th year as an
independent state, there is growing evidence to suggest that Botswana's
.development strategy, characterised by governmentdirectedmineral lead growth,
may have reached its productive limits. Botswana faces challenges of a world
economic, regional and local character which may require major adjustment.
Commentators argue that Botswana's may have reached the end of the era marked
by high and sustained growth rates, high levels of development aid and political
stabilty. The countr now faces the difficult task of fostering private sector
development, diversifying the economy, and addressing persistent problems of
poverty and inequality.
This adjustment proeess wil have to be caried out in a context of reduced donor
assistanee as many donors are phasing out their operations in Botswana due to the
countr's high level of economic growth, and a new geo-political situation in
Southern Africa. Due to the democratie reforms in Nambia and South Africa,
Botswana is also no longer the only model of democratie development in
sub-Saharan Africa and its status as front line state is no longer relevant in terms
of receiving aid donations. Is Botswana in danger of becoming marginalised both
politically and economically? Can it be argued that the much heralded
development success has been announced prernaturely? The changes and
challenges ahead pose the question as to whether Botswana after 30 years as an
independent state has developed institutional capacity which enables the country
to undertake the necessar adjustments.
These questions wil not be answered in this report. We hope, however, the report
wil help guiding decisions by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well
as the Government of Botswana, on where to seek lessons from the past to guide
strategies for the future.
The author wishes to thank Alf Morten Jerve and Chrs Sharp for substantial
inputs and comments on earlier drafts.

1 Botswana: Testimony of a development
success
1.1 Compared with whom?
The majority of sub-Saharan African nations have over the past decade
experienced negative growth rates and drastic economic dec1ine. The pluralist
political institutions established at independence were in the majority of cases
replaced by authoritarian forms of governance. A slow return to pluralist policies
are now takng place, among other things, as a result of increased pressure from
the international financial institutions arguing that governanee and economic
growth are mutually reinforcing (World Bank 1989). During this period the
sub-Saharan African region has received more development aid per capita than
any other region and increasingly the political forces and public opinion in the
Western world have stared to question whether aid, rather than promoting
development, has contributed to the escalating vicious circ1es of dec1ining
economic performanee and governance (The Economist, May 7th, 1994).
Contras ting the rather disrnal economic performanee of its sub-Saharan
neighbours, Botswana has from a staring point at independence in 1966 as one of
the poorest countries in the world, enjoyed one of the highest and most sustained
rates of economic growth in the world over the past 25 years. A commentator
noted that: "the fastest growing developing country over the past two and a half
decades was not an East Asian super exporter but a land-locked southern African
state" (Whitehead 1989). As of Januar 1996, Botswana is c1assified by DAC as
an 'Upper Middle Income Countr' from its initial placement as a 'Least
Developed Country' which in itself is an indication of aremarkable economic
progress (World Development Report, 1995). Throughout the independence period.
Botswana has also maintained a stable and largely non-corrupt democratie system
of government with free and fair elections at regular intervals since 1965. This has
been achieved in the politically and economically turbulent setting of Southern
Africa.
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Box 2: Botswan indicaton
Botswana's HDI (Human Development Indicator) raking in the composite Human
Development Report 1995 at 74, is the highest of continenta SSA (Sub-Saharan
African) nations. Its Real GDP per capita (PPPS) ran of 67 gives it a marginally
negative rating in relation to its HOI rank. In counterpint, while Botswana scores
best in continenta SSA on the IFAD "State of World Poverty" basic needs index, it
ranks significantly lower when comparng the "integrate povert index" with GNP
per capita.
Botswana, at a ranking of 55 on the "Gender related development index" (GDI) of
the UNDP, is seond only to Mauritius, at 49. in all of Afrca. Botswana's
improvement in this gender index is the largest in the entie world since 1970.
Botswana's gender empowennent index (GEM), at 38th in the world, is on ly
marginally behind Singapre at 35 and France at 31. Botswana's Female Education
Index rank is the best in Afrca
In 1996 Botswana has ben re-classified from the DAC/OECD Let Develope
Countries (LLDC) catcgory to the Upper Middle Income Countr (UMIC), the largest
such positive change in classification ever in SSA countres. For many year it had
one of the very highest ODA per capita rans in the world. In the recently compiled
Economic Freeom of the World index it is raed the highest in Afrca and 46th in
the world. Its ratng has increed substatially since 1980.
In the composite Political Freeom Index (PFI) develope by M. ul Haq, the
"father" of the UNP HDI, Botswana raned second in Afrca, 28th in the world, and
in the same elite category as the Nordic countres and only eight places behind the
UK. In the 1994 general elections, the seventh regular elections since 1965. the
combined opposition won 13 of 40 parliamenta seats outrght. If a smgle
opposition candidate had ben fielded in thee other constituencies and had a margin
of victory of less than 4% in four additional constituencies ben reversed, a 'hung'
parliament of twenty seats each would have resulte. Democracy does not get more
competitive than that.
. Botswana's economic growth rate has ben sustaned amongst the very highest in the
world for the last thirt year and the highest in the world durng the 1970-l990
period, albeit. from a very low base. Botswana's foreign exchange reserves, while
relatively modest in tota, ar amongst the very highest in the world in per capita
terms. The number of months of import cover represented by these reserves are
currently over 20 months, whereas most SSA countres have less than three months
cover.
Botswana has 17% of its land area offcially proclaimed as national parks or
reserves, the highest in the world amongst terrestral, non island nations with an
additional 21 % of the land area designated as wildlife management areas (WMAs)
with natural resource management on a sustainable basis the prime land use.
Botswana serves as the Chainnan of SADC, Co-Chainnan of the Global Coalition
for Africa and one of two African founder members of Transparency InternationaL.
Botswana has no dues arears with either the UN or OAU. It has sent troops as par
of UN peace keeping missions to Somalia, Mozambique and Rwanda where they
served with distinction.
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Since the mid-1970s Botswana has also received foreign aid on a continuous basis
from a variety of bilateral and multilateral sources and held one of the highest per
capital aid levels in the world. However, unlike most other sub-Saharan African
countries, aid is not a significant macro economic component in relation to
Botswana's GDP. Nevertheless, Botswana authorities, international donors and
independent commentators have all testified to the positive role of development
aid in Botswana's development proeess (Stevens 1981, Raphaeli et aL. 1984,
Granberg and Parkinson 1988, Mogae 1983, Molutsi 1993). And while lack of
governance has been targeted as the main development hindrance in most of
sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 1989), Botswana "has bu ilt an enviable
reputation as having one of the most effective public sector management in Africa,
and indeed among developing countries" (Raphaeli et aL. 1984). Tables 1 and 2
and Box 1 above give further testimony to the Botswana success story.
3
Table 1: Botswana in a comparative perspective: economic indicators
1965- L 973 1973-1980 1980-1987 1965-1987
Growth rate. GNP
per capita
Botswana 9.3 7.3 8.0 8.2
Sub-Sahan Africa
(SSA) 2.9 0.1 -2.8 0.1
All low-income
countres (LIC) 3.3 2.6 4.0 3.3
SSA midde-income
countres (MIC) 1.9 -1.2 0.3 0.4
Growth Rates. GDP
Botswana 14.7 10.5 13.0 12.8
SSA 5.9 2.5 0.5
All LIC 6.0 4.6 6.1
SSA MIC 5.2 1.4 3.8
Growth Rate. General
Government consumption
Botswana 5.5 14.3 13.8 10.9
SSA 9.0 7.0 -l.7
All LIC 7.5 7.2 4.4
SSA MIC 7.0 8.4 3.5
Average Innation Rate
Botswana 4.4 11.6 8.4
SSA 7.5 6.8 15.2
All LIC 9.7 8.9 8.2
SSA MIC 4.7 14.2 6.8
Growth Rate of Expons
(nomina1 $)
Botswana 20.4 18.7 16.2
SSA 15.1 0.2 -1.
All LIC 9.6 2.3 3.5
SSA MIC 7.2 3.8 4.5
Source: Lewis 1993, Somolekae 1994
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Table 2: Botswana in a comparative perspective: social indicators
lot... SU-Sleren Afriee
Llfe expten et blrth, yeera (40.0)199 (196) 59.8 (45.5) 51.8
Unr- f I Ye IDtell ir rete
per 100 liYe blrtli
175 (28)199 (196) 85 ( 173)
l-iizetlon of on-yeer-olda, I
191-90 (1911) 85 (71) 60 (30)
P&lie eiilture on heelth e.
I of GlP
1987 (196) 3.8 (1.5) 1.0 (0.7)
Adl t L I terec rete, I
199 (1970) 74 (41) 51 (27)
CCl.lne prl_ry en
ieconry enrol.nt ..etlo
191-89 (1970) 86 (46) 43 (28)
P&l le eiil ture on
edetlon e. I of GM
198 (196) 8.2 (2.7) 4.1 (2.4)
MHltery expiture ei " of IlP (0.7)198 (196) 1.9 .. 3.2
Totel externel det ei I of GlP 1
199 (198) 20.6 ( 16.2) 109.4 (28.5)
Aver.. ..l growth of IlP 1
198-90 (1965-80) 11.3 (13.9) 2.1 (4.2)
Source: Lewis 1993.
1.2 What to look for?
Why is Botswana so special? How much is development aid to be credited? Are
there characteristics of the Botswana political, social and economic system which
can account for the fact that development aid in Botswana seems to have
contributed in a virtous cyc1e of growth, whereas in most pars of the region, aid
has been par of a vicious cyc1e of rent -seeking, corruption and dec1ining rates of
growth ?
Based on its impressive development record Botswana has attracted a greater
attention than a landlocked country in Southern Africa with a population of 1.4
millon people would otherwise merit. It is to the voluminous literature of
Botswana's post-colonial political and economic development history we now turn
our attention in an attempt to grasp the main characteristics of Botswaha's
development history and to establish what role the various researchers have
attributed to international aid in Botswana's overall development since
independence. In paricular, we want to establish whether there are significant
gaps in the studies with regards to the impact of aid.
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To guide our reading of the literature, it was necessar to establish some
benchmarks for what we consider successful development. Botswana is often cited
as a successful developing nation, indeed the only developing success story in
Africa (Harland-Thunberg 1978, Diamond et aL. 1989, Healey 1995), based on the
fact that the country has experienced continuous and sustained growth-rates since
independence and at the same time maintained a stable democracy with free and
fair elections at regular intervals. We wil, however, argue that in addition to the
criteria of political participation and growth, categories emphasising institutional
capacity, social welfare and environmental sustainability should be considered in
an evaluation of a nation's development achievements. Successful development,
therefore, wil have to be judged along the following four dimensions:
- Institutional development, defined as the abilty of a polit Y to define and
implement socio economic policies and to govem in such a way as to secure
paricipation and transparency which in turn harbours for legitimacy and
stabilty.
- Economic growth, which in order to be sustainable, should have a relatively
diverse base and encourage private sector development.
- Growth in social welfare, which is a question of how national wealth is
reinvested and distributed among the population at large in terms of
employment and social sector development.
- Environmental protection, or the extent to which economic policies pursued
have been sustainable in terms of ecological considerations.
How does the literature on Botswana's political and economic development
history judge Botswana according to these broad principles?
The presentation runs through five stages. In the next chapter we present the main
arguments and explanations provided in the literature regarding the success of
Botswana's development, while in Chapter 3 we identify problem areas. Chapter 4
gives the main characteristic of development aid to Botswana since independence.
In the Chapter 5 we try to identify the inter-connections between international aid
and the general indicators of Botswana's development found in the literature.
Based on these findings, the last chapter identifies what we consider the main gaps
in the literature consulted concerning the relationship between aid and
development.
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2 Examining the success
According to Patrick Molutsi (1993: 60), Botswana has gained what it has
achieved by exporting three key commodities; diamonds, beef and ideology. If the
term ideology is defined broadly to inc1ude the system of government,
development strategies and political attitudes, and if diamonds and beef refer to
the several exceptional sources of foreign exchange and government revenue
benefiting Botswana, it can be argued that Molutsi's short remark covers the main
success-areas presented in the literature. When examining why these areas have
become foundations of development success, many observers prefer to star by
emphasising the beginning.
2.1 The 'advantage ' of backwardness
2.1.1 Colonial neglect
Botswana was a protectorate of Britain from 1885. The Bechuanaland Protectorate
was established in order to prevent the Boers in Transvaal and the Germans in
South West Africa from interfering with the transport route from the Cape Colony
to the territories in central Africa under British control. Bechuanaland had in itself
no intrinsic value to the British authorities as the territory was regarded to hold no
natural resources and as a consequence it was not attractive to capital investment
(Harvey and Lewis 1990: 15-18). Despite more than eighty years of British rule,
Botswana therefore inherited very little in 1966. Even by comparison to other
British colonies in the region, Bechuanaland suffered acute neglect by the
authorities, a symbol of this is the fact that the territory was administered from
South Africa (Vryburg and from 1895 Mafeking).
Botswana had at the time of independence no capital city and in terms of physical
infrastructure and skilled people the neglect was almost total until ten years before
independence. A country about the size of Franee and Belgium combined had
approximately 25 km of tarred roads, no urban infrastrueture, few productive
assets and no employment opportunities. With virtually no secondary schools,
Botswana started its development path with a mostly uneducated populace
engaged in subsistence cattle farmng (Stedman 1993, Picard 1987).
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2.1.2 Hostile environments
At the time of independence in 1966, Botswana was one of the poorest countries
in the world. It is difficult to argue that lue k was on Botswana's side at this point.
The country had experienced the worst drought in memory and approximately one
fifth of the population had been dose to starvation. The cattle herd on which both
the rural and national economy depended had been decimated (Colc1ough 1983:1).
Botswana had one further disadvantage shared only by Lesotho and Swaziland.
The new nation was completely surrounded by hostile states with minority white
regimes. Botswana's president Sir Quett Masire is reported to have remarked that
when the people of Bechuanaland asked for independence from the British,
"people thought we were either very brave or very foolish" (Lewis 1993: 14).
Considering Botswana's staring point, the presidents comment may be regarded
with considerable understanding.
2.1.3 No colonial heritage
At independence, Botswana depended entirely on grants from Britain to cover its
recurrent budget. It had no financial reserves. Commentators have argued that the
status as a protectorate had the advantage of leaving the land in the hands of
Tswana and other indigenous people. In many respects therefore,
de-colonialisation was, relatively speaking, 'not painful either to Botswana nor
Britain. Contrar to many other former colonies in Africa, were the sense of bein g
exploited by the colonial administrations stil reflects itself in unwilingness to
seek and accept advice and assistance from foreign sources, Botswana's
independence politics has been characterised by a lack of ideological fervour and
a wilingness to substitute expatriates for absent local capabilities: "The arm's
length colonialism practised by Britain has been a factor in shaping Botswana's
attitude towards outside assistance (Raphaeli et aL. 1984: 6).
Also stressing the advantages of backwardness, Harvey and Lewis argue that by
not inheriting anything from the British, Botswana also avoided the heritage of the
colonial attitudes, the hierarchies based on status in the civil service, the large
residences of senior officials, the bands of government c1erks who lorded over
their fellow citizens who they were supposed to serve. Furthermore, Botswana did
not inherit any tradition of government intervention in the economy (Harey and
Lewis 1990: 26). The absenee of urban bias in Botswana politics, of ten referred to
as an element of the country's successful economic management, may also partly
be explained by its lack of development at independence. With no real towns and
subsequently no urban c1ass at independence, urban biases had limited opportunity
to develop in the first decade after independence.
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2.1.4 Learning from neighbours
Another aspect of the so called advantages of backwardness is related to the aspect
of leaming. By the time Botswana acquired some controlover macro economic
policy in the mid-1970s it was already possible to observe the very high costs of
economic mismanagement in Africa as members of government travelled
extensively to other parts of Africa and where able to observe the disastrous
declines of some economies(Harey 1992: 25).
2.1.5 Dealing with apartheid
Botswana's landlocked position and dependency on South Africa was an
additional factor adding to the disrnal development prospects in 1966. However,
as the lack of development to acertain extent benefited the country, it has been
argued that the c10se relationship between Botswana and South Africa may have
had a positive effect. A number of Batswana had lived or worked in the South
African Republie, and subsequently experienced a racially divided society and the
human folly of aparheid: "Botswana's abilty to deal with, negotiate with, and to
coexist with its overwhelmingly dominant neighbour, may be related to the
decades of direct exposure and accumulated wisdom and experience that came
. with it" (Harey and Lewis 1990: 26).
2.2 Leadership, participation and culture
Most observers regard the quality of the Botswana leadership as a key explanatory
factor behind the country's successful development record, and many refer to the
culture and indigenous political structure of the Twana.
2.2.1 Seretse Khama
The pragmatie attitudes and moderate political ideology which developed after
independence is by many attributed to the role and personality of the first
president, Sir Seretse Khama (Parsons 1990, Stedman 1993, Picard 1987).
According to Zaffiro the enlightened leadership of Khama single-handedly
established the legitimacy and credibility of the new state in international politics
(1993: 139). A similar characteristic of the country's two presidents since
independence are given by Harey and Lewis:
"President Khama set the tone of government with common sense, good humour,
honesty and a desire to learn lessons from' other countries. President Masire
developed a ...detailed knowledge of all aspects of the economy over the first 15
years of independence and provided a key link between the technicians, the cabinet
and the parliament (1990: 9).
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2.2.2 'Pragmatism' as ideology
Regarding Botswana's positively acclaimed governanee record, the leve! of
pragmatism in policy-formulation is often emphasised. A well defined set of
development priorities was identified early, expressed through an explicit
commtment to rapid economic growth through rational ca1culations of means
with ends (Du Toit 1995: 39, Morrison 1993: 45). Morrison argues that the
bureaucratie dominance of the colonial administration in the pre-independence era
and the deliberate choices of Sir Seretse Khama in establishing an ideological
rationale for political rule reinforced one another in the immediate post
independence period.
The priorities to growth (before redistribution) and stabilty (before paricipation)
became part of what Morrison refers to as the "general logic" of state bu ilding that
guided the governing elite (Morrison 1987: 567-573). According to Du Toit, an
ideology of pragmatism expressed through technocratic priorities, gave a
consistent direction not only to day-to-day public policy making but also to the
proeess of state building and hence to the arena in which democratic pary politics
was being conducted (1995: 39).
2.2.3 The rural support base of the politicalleadership
Closely related to the quality of leadership are accounts focusing on the
background and support bases of the political leadership. A number of studies
have emphasised the impact of the homogenous, rural based elite in Botswana
with strong interests in the cattle industry (Parson 1990, Picard 1987, Danevad
1993). According to Picard, the political system is dominated by a wealthy, well
educated cattle owning political elite commtted to rapid economic growth in the
framework of a largely free enterprise system (1987). The political leaderships
c10se ties to the rural economy, and the cattle holding rural elite, is by some
commentators regarded as the main explanatory factor behind Botswana's
economic policy choices and economic success.
Contrar to many other African nations, it is argued that Botswana's political
leadership has found it conducive to reinvest national wealth in their own country
(Harey 1992, Danevad 1993). Related to the impact of culture, it has also been
argued that the pastoralist characteristic of risk avoidance and asset accumulation
has been a guiding feature of Botswana's management of its economic resources
after independence. As argued by Holm: "Indeed, the government seeks to
maintain a surplus for bad times": (Holm 1988: 198). With respect to this element,
it is interesting to note that Botswana political authorities, when asked to comment
on the success of Botswana, stress that Botswana has not found the formula of
success, they have simply tried to plan carefully (Mogae 1983, Horner 1995,
Matambo and Tumelo 1991).
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2.2.4 Lack of urban bias
Another factor distinguishing Botswana's economic management from many
neighbouring economies in Africa is the absenee of urban bias. Urban bias, or an
emphasis on the economic needs of the urban constituents at the expense of rural
dwellers, has been very dominant in sub-Saharan Africa (Bates 1981). Botswana is
here an exception. This has been attributed to the smallness of the urban sector (or
the virtual absenee of urban life at independence) (Dane vad 1993).
Possibly more importantly with respect to urban bias, is the relative power of the
rural producers in Botswana's politics (Harey 1992). Whereas in many African
countries the agricultural sector has been dominated by a poor peasantry easily
exploited, the agricultural sector in Botswana constitutes an economic and
political elite. According to Holm and Molutsi, the Botswana government has had
an explicit policy of not allowing the real exchange rate to appreciate, thus
ensuring that urban consumers have not been as advantaged as in many other
African countries in that imports are not arificially cheap.
The rapid stabilisation measures in 1981 (see section 2.3.3) is a further indication
of a lack of urban bias in Botswana polities, according to the commentators. The
stabilsation policy was deliberately designed to allow for the drought relief
prograres to continue undiminished (Charlton 1991: 278) and according to
Quinn : "Most of the burden fell on the better off urban groups who had their
wages frozen and found it more difficult to obtain credit" (1988: 10).
2.2.5 Redistributory concerns
The successful drought relief measures taken by the Government of Botswana is
in a number of studies related to the governments implementation capacity. But
the drought relief policy is also regarded as an indication of concern for the
welfare of the rural poor (Du Toit 1995, Holm and Molutsi 1992, Charlton 1991).
The main example pointed to is the fact that during the severe drought from 1982
to 1987 government programmesprovided for all needy groups in the population
(app. 65 per cent in the rural areas), no matter how remote. According to Holm
and Molutsi, suffcient food ensured that there was only a marginal increase in
malnutrition during the entire period (1992: 82).
2.2.6 Adherence to the principles of democracy and human rights
A good governance record is not only related to issues of effectiveness and
implementation capacity. Issues of popular paricipation, political legitimacy and
accountability have also increasingly become recognised as necessary ingredients
of a successful development strategy by donors as well as African citizens and.
governments (World Bank 1989, Stevens 1995, Jaycox 1995). It is maybe with
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respect to its democratic record that Botswana is most often emphasised II
comparati ve studies as the main success story in Africa.
Apar from Mauritius, Botswana has as the only country in Africa maintained its
democratie constitution allowing for multiparty elections, freedom of participation
and the press throughout the period of independence. The country has a small, but
according to the Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook, free press, no
political prisoners and a commtment to non-racialism in political life In short,
Botswana is regarded to hold a very high human rights record (Takirambudde
1995).
2.2.7 Limited democracy - a success indicator?
Yet while the respect for basic political rights and electoral pluralism is heralded
by most commentators, the content and depth of the Botswana democracy is often
debated. Though the government has never wavered in its support for pluralism
and diversity of autonomous political groupings, ideals and interests, the system
has never been truly competitive during most of the post-independence according
to Holm who characterise the political proeess in Botswana as "paternalistic
democracy (1988: 179). Picard uses the term "a defacto one party state" (1987:
142).
Those questioning the leve! of institutionalism in Botswana's democracy, remark
that the ruling party has been in power since independence and that there is very
limited paricipation and citizen influence on the policy making proeess (Holm
and Molutsi 1991). Yet, while acknowledging the limited degree of popular
paricipation in policy-makng in Botswana, some commentators have argued that
this factor has largely benefited the system of governanee per se:
'the Botswana mode\' has provided an opportunity for citizens to learn about and
become involved in democratic structures befare societal mobilsation has created a
wide range of organisational groups to demand such strctures at the mass and elite
levels: The absence of mass political activity may have given the regime time to gain
suffcient legitimacy to survive the inevitably mare intense political conflcts to
come" (Holm 1993: 107).
This argument, and possibly the strength of the democratic system, may for the
first time be tested in the coming years, as in the 1994 elections the main
opposition pary Botswana National Front (BNF) won one-third of the 40 seats in
parliament and won almost all the local government elections in major towns. The
1994 elections were also marked by the private press' ability to embarrass the
government by exposing a number of corruption scandals (Maipose et aL. 1995,
Cokorinos 1994). According to one observer: "For the first time in the history of
pary and parliamentar politics in Botswana, the BNF victory estab1ished an
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opposition which can no longer be overlooked and neglected (Takrambudde
1995: 137).
2.2.8 Ethnic homogeneity
Botswana's ethnically homogenous population is often presented as an explanatory
factor for why the country, contrar to most of its neighbours has remained a
multipary democracy throughout the independence period. According to Du Toit,
this assumption is erroneous, as ethnic homogeneity cannot be equated with ethnic
singularity and secondly the linguistic predominance of Setswana obscures the
extent of cultural diversity in Botswana. " What is remarkable in Botswana is how
much, up till now, the legitimacy of Tswana-dom has been accepted an even
supported by non-Tswana groups" (1995: 7).
Based on this, Du Toit argues that what needs explanation is why this range of
cultural diversity from Tswana to non- Tswana has not yet surfaced in more
assertive ethnic terms in Botswana (1995: 18).
2.3 Managing the national wealth
2.3.1 The mining industry
At independence, few people could have predicted the fundamental changes which
would occur in the country's economy over the following decades. The review of
Botswana's economic prospects conducted by the British government in 1965 paid
scant attention to the mining sector and few contemporary commentators would
have believed that investments in mineral extraction could be primarily
responsible for a quadrupling real per capita incomes over the next decades
(Colc1ough 1983: 1) Much of this was developed by mining and related industry.
Large scale exploitation of diamonds stared in 1971 when the Orapa mine came
into operation. In 1982, the Jwaneng mine was also opened, leading to a marked
increase in Botswana's total produetion. By 1987, Botswana had become the
world's third largest producer of diamonds, and the biggest producer in terms of
value (Blomström and Nordberg 1991, Yeager 1993).
2.3.2 Negotiating skUls
While mining accounts for the main revenue generating activity in Botswana,
development aid, export of beef to the world market through EEC and incornes
generated from the re-negotiated Southern African Customs Union in 1969 are
described as the other main elements behind the economic growth experienced in
Botswana since the beginning of the 1970s (Harey and Lewis 1990, Lewis 1993).
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It is here interesting to note that all factors mentioned have resulted from
negotiations between the Botswana government and outside investors,
development bans and donors.
According to Harey and Lewis, skills in negotiating with more powerful
outsiders have been show ed by the Batswana since at least the early 19 century
(1990:8). South Africa as a neighbour was an element of reality. Yet, despite the
costs imposed by South Africa's destabilising policies and the economic
dependency on the large and powerful neighbour, Botswana managed to have
fairly advantageous commercial relations according to Harey and Lewis (ibid.).
The most significant negotiation arguably relates to the Governments relations
with De Beers. The Botswana mines are owned today by Debswana, a joint
venture between the Government of Botswana and De Beers mining company.
Debswana was created in 1969 dividing the profits between the two at 85% to De
Beers and 15% to the Government of Botswana. This deal was re-negotiated in
1975 as the Botswana government argued that the mines had yielded far higher
profit than anticipated. The new agreement gave the government a 50% share of
the revenues.
Harvey and Lewis further describe in fascinating detail how the re-negotiation of
the Southern African Customs Union Agreement in 1969 drastically increasing the
revenues occurring to Botswana (ibid.). According to Festus Mogae, the revenues
from the SACU agreement rose from Pula 8.3 millon in 1971-72 to Pula 102.8
millon in 1980-81 (1983: 20). The winning of access for more than half the
country's beef exports to the pricing benefits of the European Community's
Common Agricultural Policy was also of major importanee (Harvey and Lewis
1990: 6-9).
2.3.3 Prudent economic management
During the first 25 years of independence, a truly remarkable economic
transformation occurred. GDP rose at an annual rate of 13.9 per cent. When the
years 1965 and 1985 are taken as bench mark, Botswana achieved the highest
growth rate in the world (Stedman 1993). Botswana's debt service is modest and
its foreign exchange reserves are the highest on the continent in terms of months
of import cover. As a result, the Botswana currency, the Pula, is anecdotally
referred to as the Swiss Franc of Africa (Somolekae 1994: 18).
The fact that Botswana became the world's fastest growing economy in the period
between 1966 and 1991 was perhaps to be expected due to the discovery of large
mineral deposits. However, the record of most oil produeing and hard mineral
exporting countries in the world has demonstrated that mineral wealth is no
guarantee for sustained economic deve10pment. Mining economies throughout
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Africa have been caught in rent-seeking traps whereby state elites have derived
profits from national resources for their own personal benefits or "political spoils".
While acknowledging a certain element of luck in terms of discovering mineral
deposits, most commentators c1aim that good management is the key explanatory
factor in Botswana's economic development as Botswana avoided many of the
economic problems that have plagued other primar commodity exporters by
adopting appropriate stabilsing macro economic policies (Hil, C.B. and
Mokgethi, D.N. 1989, Du Toit 1995). According to Gulhati, conservative fiscal
and monetary polices have been pursued by the government with a very good
implementation capacity, and sustained development capabilties sharly
distinguishing the country from other SSA countries (1990).
2.3.4 Dutch disease avoidance
Botswana's economic management capacity is also reflected in the fact that the
country has avoided the traps of 'Dutch disease'. Economies that eam substantial
foreign exchange from a single commodity are vulnerable to 'Dutch disease' in
which the currency becomes overvalued and other export sectors are rendered
un-competitive. Harvey characterises Botswana as a case of 'Dutch disease
avoidance' as exchange rates have not risen (1992: 1).
The governments quick and successful reaction to the relatively short-lived
collapse of diamond exports in 1981-82 is by a number of commentators viewed
as an indication of the governments abilty to react to external changes.
According to Charlton, the Botswana authorities did not wait for the market to
pick up, but implemented decisive adjustment measures, the result being that
foreign exchange reserves recovered so quickly that Botswana was never eligible
to borrow from IMF stabilisation funds (Charlton 1991, Harvey 1992, Quinn
1988).
2.3.5 Pluralist politics and market economics
In much of the comparative literature focusing on political and economic
development in Africa, Botswana is focused upon as an example of how good
govemance and economic growth are mutually reinforcing developments
(Diamond et aL. 1988, Bratton and Hyden 1992, Danevad 1993). A recently
conducted study by Healey conc1udes that it is diffcult to attribute Botswana's
generally impressive record in the management of public expenditure directly to
its multiparty electoral system (1995: 60). Nevertheless, other studies have found
a strong link between the electoral policies and the perceived need to satisfy votes
in rural areas in Botswana. Charlton argues that regular competitive elections have
rendered Botswana's ruling politicians more immediately sensitive to the needs of
at least some vulnerable but electorally important segments of its population
(Charlton: 1991: 279).
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Focusing on the development expenditures of the government of Botswana on
social sectors and in paricular the drought relief programe in 1984-85 which
mainly reached the poor, Holm argues that the determnation to reach out to such
large segments of the population is due to politics of elections. Simply put: the
BDP wants to keep its voters (1992: 198). While the origins of an electorally
driven fiscal cycle has never been systematically studied in Botswana, a number of
studies have argued that an overt rural expenditure focus dates at least from the
run up to the 1974 election with the initiation of the Accelerated Rural
development Programme (Chambers 1973, Charlton 1991, Du Toit 1995, Holm
and Molutsi 1992 ). We wil return to this issue when discussing the impacts of
development aid in Chapter 4.
2.3.6 The strong influence of civil servants
Contrasting the civil service in many African countries, characterised in various
shades of patrimonialism and personal rule, Botswana is in the literature
characterised as having an outstanding governance record (Healey 1995,
Takrambudde 1995, Charlton 1991). This is in most accounts attributed to the
presenee of a strong, autonomous, effective and corruption-free bureaucracy. The
dominance of the civil service is emphasised in a number of studies. General ly ,
there seem to be an agreement among scholars that Botswana's civil service is
characterised by a long standing and rather comfortable working relationship
between senior politicians of the ruling party and civil servants (Charlton 1991,
Gulhati 1990, Picard, 1987, Morrison 1993).
Gunderson (1970) characterises the Botswana political system as an
administrative democracy and argues that civil servants have been very influential
actors from the start in the Botswana policy makng proeess. Generally , according
to Harey and Lewis, the role of the state has been pivotal for the effective
management of Botswana's development policy and aid resources. Issues
emphasised here are attention to key issues of management and the appreciation of
the importance ofplanning for sustaining lon g term growth (1990: 2).
2.3.7 Continued presence of expatriates in civil service
An other indication of a pragmatist, rather than ideological political culture often
found in other African countries after independence, is indicated by the fact that
Africanisation of the civil service, incidentally referred to as 'localisation' in
Botswana, did not feature as an important issue on the political agenda (Danevad
1993, Picard 1987, Stedman 1993, Parsons 1990). Similarly, there appears to have
been little hostilty towards expatriates in civil service. (ibid.).
According to Isaksen, the presenee of expatriates in key positions has fostered a
conservative attitude to public spending as the expatriates are engaged for a short
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term and in order to leave with a good record seem to avoid risks and
experimentative policies (1981: 37). We wil retum to the issue of expatriate
personnel when discussing the impact of foreign aid through technical assistance
in Chapter 4.
2.4 Summary
The literature presented above has indicated that Botswana has achieved and
maintained its economic growth due to economic management. The capacity of
the government and civil service to design development strategies and to
implement these policies which have developed over the last 30 years is
impressive by most standards, and paricularly so in an Africa context. The
literature reviewed has indicated that Botswana's good fortune of discovering
diamonds after independence could easily have been lost if the combined effects
of prudent economic management, good negotiation skills, and a political system
allowing for redistributionar demands and political stability had not been in
place. However, the question of growth for whom and growth into the future stil
poses some critical problems for Botswana.
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3 Examining the problems
Naturally, when discussing aspects of distribution, economic diversity and welfare
in a developing growth economy, the point of deparureofthe various authors in
question c1early determines the conclusions arived upon. Du Toit captures this
dilemma arguing that a characterisation of the development process depends on
whether the evaluator chooses to look at the development from the perspective of
"the glass being half empty or half full" (Du Toit 1995: 66). And while it is
necessar to balance the views between the literature sources, it cannot be
disputed that there are serious shortcomings to the overall success picture of
Botswana relating to income distribution, poverty, employment creation and
environmental protection.
3.1 Unemployment
It has been argued by a number of commentators that neither of the two main
economic activities in Botswana, cattle rearing and mining, generate much
employment nor do they have many linkages and multiplier effects to other
industries. Based on the limited employment creation in Botswana, Claus and
Weimer characterises Botswana as a case of growth without development or
growth without employment (1993: 188). Skilled labour continues to be in short
supply while opportunities for unskilled labour have been limited due to the highly
capital intensive nature of the mining sector along with limited growth. of
manufacturing and other labour intensive sectors.
According to Colc1ough and McCarhy, the post-independence economic boom
did employ more people but it did not eradicate the problems of unemployment.
Despite the fact that formal sector employment averaged at an annual growth rate
of 10 percent, the rate of entry to the labour market was not matched (1980: 177).
Du Toit argues that the dec1ining opportunities for employment by Batswana in
South Africa has exacerbated the unemployment problem further. At
independence about 1/3 of Batswana worked outside the country. According to
figures presented, this category of employment decreased from a peak at app.
70,000 in the mid-1970s to 18,800 in 1983 (Du Toit 1995: 41).
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Box 3: GeDder and politics: EDCOUraDl woman to stad up
Granberg and Parkinson find that the financial sources to women for income
generating activities are limite and mainly unobtanable to women of lesser means
and resources (1988: 35). A furter impeiment to women seking loans and creit
facilities is posed by the marta power clause of the Marage Act. Since mared
women under community of propert are regared as minor, they may not enter into
any contract without the written consent of their husband (ibid. 35). Geilser critically
discusses the role of women in Botswana politics arguing that women have featured
even less in political pares in Botswana than other Southem Afrcan nations as there
was no independent strggle to draw them into politics (1995: 549). The goveming
par did not form a women's' wing until 1987, ten yea afer the main opposition
pary BNF did so. However, argues Geisler, as the women's wings are dominate by
wives of politicians and focused around issues of welfare and fundraising-activities,
they do not function as viable political platform for young professional women
(1995: 550).
In 1993. a new Woman's NGO was formed with a main objective to lobby political
paries to nominate more women and furer to educate female voters to vote for
woman candidates. According to Mogwe. Emag Basadi, or 'Stad Up Women'
emerged as a reaction to a High Court Ruling in 1992 which declar setors of the
Botswana Citizenship Law discriminatory against women and therefore
unconstitutional. This ruling was the result of a hearng of the case of Unity Dow.
Being mared to a non-Motswana meant that the children bom during the marage
were by the law given the cItizenship of their non-Motswana father despite the fact
that they were bom in Botswana and had lived there all there lives. The state argued
that they had taen into account the traditional view that a child bom to a mared
couple belonged to the father. This argument was rejected by the High Cour of
Appeal (Mogwe 1993). The success of Emang Basadi to educate women to vote for
women candidates in the 1994 election, however, showed Iimited results due to the
fact that the two main paries appointed very few female candidates, according to
Geisler (1995: 556). It is also evident that the vigorous campaign-strategies
employed by the new women NGO alienated some women politicians (ibid.).
3.2 Inequality
It is often argued that unemployment has exacerbated another prominent feature of
the Botswana economy, that of marked inequality. The overall dimensions of
inequality in the economy have been expressed in varous ways. Research citing
the 1985-86 offcial household income and expenditure survey reveals that the
poorest 40 per cent of the household received 10.7 per cent of the income and the
top 20 per cent 61.5 per cent (Du Toit 1995: 43).
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The inequality of income distribution is expressed in a Gini coeffcient of 0.556,
which according to one observer is a level of inequality exceeded only by Brazil
(Good 1992). Although government policy explicitly emphasise social equity, the
government and political leaders have by a number of commentators been
criticised for not implementing land reforms and other measures that would reduce
income disparities (Colc1ough and McCarhy 1980, Good, 1992).
3.3 Rural poverty
Despite the governments stated objectives to develop the rural sectors of the
economy, the skewed income distribution is argued to have an urban rural
dimension. Approximately 70 per cent of Botswana's population live in rural
areas. Estimates by the Central Statistical Offce (1991) showed that app. 64 per
cent of the rural population live below the povert line (Du Toit 1995: 44,
Perrings 1996). The official rural income distribution from 1974-75 cited by many
authors, indicates that 45 per cent of all rural households owned no cattle. Another
40 per cent owned 25 per cent of the national herd and the remaining 15 percent
owned 75 per cent of the herd. Within the last category, 5 percent owned 50 per
cent of all the cattle (Du Toit 1995: 43). While the estimates given here are
uncertain and both methods and results have been questioned (Holm 1989), it is
diffcult to deny the presence of marked inequality in the Botswana society.
According to Picard (1980) the origins of inequality originated in the cattle
economy which existed in pre-colonial times. Based on a system where land was
communally owned whereas cattle were private it yielded equitable results and
was ecologically sustainable only as long as the frontier was moving. With
scarcity of land the inequalities rapidly developed (Picard 1980: 321-322, Yeager
1989:388). This strctural tendency to inequality was rapidly reinforced after
independence by the effects of de facto ownership of boreholes and surrounding
land, effectively favouring the wealthier cattle ranchers (Du Toit 1995: 43, Jerve
1982).
According to Colclough and McCarthy, the impact of cattle ownership on other
sectors of the economy has been cumulative as catte holders are favoured in terms
of rural credit, agricultural extension services and drought relief measures (1980:
135-137). Picard argues that government in Botswana since independence has
been an urban affair and that the small political, bureaucratie and land owning
elites have been the prime beneficiaries of state power (1987). Colc1ough argues
further that given the overall record on economic growth and the fact that over
half of GDP is generated as public revenue, its disposition has c1early had a less
than satisfactory impact on equity and poverty alleviation (Colc1ough 1991: 147).
However, while the issue of inequality is regarded as a major problem in almost
all accounts on Botswana's post-independence development, not everyone agrees
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to the strong criticism of the Botswana government expressed by Colc1ough and
Picard above. Some commentators attribute the unsatisfactory performance in
alleviating poverty through the failure of the programmes for agriculture and rural
development, due to environmental factors rather than a deliberate lack of concern
by the authorities. Harey, among others, points to the fact that the government
has reduced inequalities in the provision of public services, greatly increasing the
social services available to everyone (1992: 2). He further argues that the growth
in formal sector employment at 10 per cent annually over a 20 year period served
to reduce the inequalities in rural income as a large majority of rural households
had at least one member in formal sector employment (ibid.).
Based on surveys of social indicators in Botswana compared to other African
countries, a number of scholars, preferring to analyse the situation from 'the glass
is half full-perspective', argue that although income and distribution remain major
concems, the quality of life has improved for the majority of the rural people
(Charlton 1991, Holm 1989, Du Toit 1995, Perrings 1996).
3.4 Lack of economic diversity
Mining contributes approximately 40 per cent to Botswana's gross national
product, which makes economic growth heavily dependent on developments in
this sec tor. However, the fact that diamond revenue has ceased to expand at the
rapid pace that pushed Botswana to the top of the league of the world's fastest
growing economies in the 1970s and 1980s has raised concern about the prospects
for diversity of Botswana's economy. Economic analysts have since the beginning
of the 1990s argued that Botswana, in order to cope with the fact that diamonds
can no longer provide the fuel for growth, wil have to go through profound
structural adjustments (Blomström and Sjögren 1993, Curr 1987). The
government of Botswana successfully managed to stabilse the economy due to a
short period of dec1ine in diamond revenues in 1980-81. However, according to
economic analysts, the current situation is more precarious as expenditure is
driven more by recurrent costs, and diamond revenues are unlikely to regain
previous growth rates.
According to Danevad, the manufacturing industry has contributed to formal
sector employment, paricularly in the private sector, throughout the 1970's and
80s. However, in its efforts to induce economic diversification, the government
has overlooked major constraints such as the in sufficient competence of
entrepreneurs, skils of the workers, the inadequate functioning of the markets and
technological weakesses (1993: 45-46). Furthermore, despite the fact that
Botswana has maintained since independence a policy of encouraging the private
sector, the development of an indigenous private sec tor is argued to have been
limited (Somolekae 1994).
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Box 4: Eovironmeota protetioo and the serch ror water: The fight ror
Okavango.
A World Bank miss ion to Botswana in 1984 conc1uded that shortge of water may
serve as the biggest brake on development effort suggesting that Gaborone could
beome the firt city in the world forced to limit its growt for lack of water (Raphaeli:
1984: 11). The countr's search for new water sources to its rapidly increasing
population resulted in 1987 in the decision to tap the Okavango water system for
industral and agrcultural purpses. However, the Boro dredging project in the
Okavango delta beame a main rallying point both for international environment
groups and local people in the town of Maun. Greenpee orchestrated a controversial
'Diamonds are for death' campaign advocating for a boycott of Botswana's main export
eaer. However, it is argued that the main reasn why the government decided to
suspend the water development scheme in early 1991 was following a kgotla meeting
(vilage council) in Januar 1991 where for seven hours local residents and
conservationalists told the visiting Minister of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs
that the scheme would theaten their livelihoos (James 1991, Weimer and Claus 1993).
The suspension of the water dredging project is perceived as a major victory for
democracy for the local people of Maun and furer an indication of the kgotla
reasertng itslf as a major forum for consultations and decision-makng. according to
reports (ibid.)
3.5 Overgrazing and the question of environmental
sustainability
Another problem area related to the sustainabilty of the current economic
development strategy,. relates to environmental concerns. Discussing the future
challenges facing Botswana in a new Southern African regional context, Weimer
and Claus argue that the realisation that ecological problems do not respect
national borders wil compel the government to work in tandem on 'ecological
economical orders' (1993: 187).
Concern for the environment in Botswana, stems mainly from its fragility. Located
almost entirely in southern Africa's ard and semi-arid zones, Botswana receives
very little rainfall and prolonged droughts constitute major threats. Botswana has
on a number of occasions been criticised for not addressing environmental
protection and not designing policies to prevent or balance the negative
consequences of industrial and agricultural development. However, it can be
argued that so far, the country's economic growth has enabled the leadership to
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buy protection against drought (Yeager 1993: 125). The two main environmental
problems touche d upon in the literature relates to the shortage of water and the
environmental damage caused by the growth of the national cattle herd.
The environmental problems caused by cattle rearing relates to the negative
impact of veterinar fencing on wildlife and further to the environmental pollution
caused by the so called 'war on tsetse fles' (Weimer and Claus 1993: 196).
However, the most critical aspect with respect tocattle rearing may be the effects
of overgrazing. According to Granberg and Parkinson, new technology has made
it possible to tap water and thereby extend cattle rearing to newareas of the
country. The increase both in cattle and land use has increased the areas at risk of
degradation from overgrazing (1988: 44).
Yeager among others, argue that the confrontation between the demands of
political legitimacy and support on the one hand and the requirements of
environmental protection is becoming a pressing issue in Botswana. Despite the
growing concern with overgrazing, however, a number of studies have argued that
environmental concerns wil continue to be sacrificed by the political authorities
for other vested interests due to the dose ties between the political leadership and
rural elites with interests in cattle (Yeager 1993: 124, Picard 1987, Isaksen 1981).
3.6 Summary
The discussion above has presented authors and positions questioning Botswana's
much heralded successful development. The factors pointing to structural
inequalities, problems of diversification, rural unemployment and environmental
problems related to water shortage and overgrazing, sugge st that the development
success story may need to be qualified. However, the literature consulted has also
strongly indicated that more than any other country in the region, the Government
of Botswana has indicated both an interest and capacity to address these problems.
Furthermore, few of the studies consulted have disputed that Botswana has
protected their assets well, albeit conservatively, and as aresult achieved high
rates of growth and a stable political system characterised by high levels of
predictabilty and transparency. A final note is waranted by the complete absence
of the problem of AIDS in the literature reviewed. If projections are correct, the
threat to Botswana's institutional and social fabric is paramount (see Box 5).
23
Box 5: The problem of AIDS and consquencesfordevelopment
The L 995 HI sentinel surey conducte by the Prncess Marna Hospital in
Gaborone show that the overall prevalence of HI amongst the total population in
Botswana is 12,5 per cent. However, when the prevalence is calclllated for the age
group most at risk of HIV infection, the so-called sexually active category of ages
15-45, the figures average at approximately 24 per cent. While the figures are high
in all distrcts surveyed, some distrcts ar harder effected than others. The
prevalence of HI positively among pregnant women in Francistown was 39,6 per
cent, the same figure for Gaborone was 28,7 per cent and 18,9 per cent for the rural
distrct of Ghantsi, which was' the 10west rate obtaned. These figures give a
projecte tota number of HI infecte persons of 180,00 in Botswana in 1996.
According to the surey from the Marna Hospita, HI relate ilness is now the
commonest reason for admission to medical war in Botswana. At Marna Hospital
the unit account is app.. 50 per cent of all admissions. According to the World
Health Organisation Botswana is regarded as having the second worst figures of all
countres, exceeed only by Zimbabwe.
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4 The impact of aid in Botswana's
development
Throughout the period after independence, Botswana has received foreign aid on a
continuous basis from a variety of sources. What we now want to consider is to
what extent aid has contributed to this overall development picture according to
the literature. Due to the income from diamond revenues, some commentators
have argued that aid has been largely superfluous in Botswana as the country has
had revenues to finance its own development. To what extent is this general
comment supported in the literature? Before discussing the actual outputs or
results of development aid funding, we present some general characteristics of the
aid relationship in Botswana as it appears in the literature. Finally, we try to
identify some linkages between aid and the overall development performanee of
Botswana as presented in Chapters 2 and 3.
4.1 The coming of aid
4.1.1 Starting with Britain
At independence in 1966 half of Botswana's government budget was grants from
Britain and these funds had to be shared between development projects and the
continuing need for recurrent budget support. As a result, in the first five years
after independence, 57 per cent of total development spending was financed by
Britain (Stevens 1989: 159). In the next ten years, development spending
increased seven and a half times in money terms and aid agreements had been
negotiated with a long list of international agencies and bilateral sources (Stevens
1981: 159).
4.1.2 The Shashe project
The large influx of foreign aid as well as private investors in the early 1970s was
initially related to the discovery of a copper nickel mine in north Eastern
Botswana at Selebi Phikwe. The copper nickel mine and associated infrastrueture
which is referred to as the Shashe project, was expected to provide a sizeable
investment activity, to become a major source of direct employment, to diversify
exports and greatly increase government revenue (Harey and Lewis 1990: 137).
However, the combination of severely escalating project costs, delayed star up
due to technological troubles and falling metal prices meant that the Shashe
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project never became a profitable return on investments. However, in terms of
long term learning and introducing major international donors, as well as private
investments companies to Botswana, the Shashe project provided very important
lessons.
First of all, the construction of the Shashe project provided revenues for the
government as it added considerably to customs receipts from the Southern
African Customs Union. This lead directly to budgetar self sufficiency for the
Government of Botswana, achieved for the first time in 1973 (Stevens 1981).
Secondly, while the majority of investments in the mining sector came from
private sources, foreign aid provided a substantial amount of financial support for
the development of infrastructure. According to Stevens, the size and magnitude
of this project exposed the various bi-and multilateral aid agencies involved to
Botswana and the countr's development prospects and paricularly to the fact
that the country had the ability to co-ordinate a project of this magnitude and
complexity (1981: 162).
4.1.3 Seeking diversification
Apar from the Shashe project, additional efforts to diversify aid sources were
taken by the Botswana Government at an early stage of development. According
to Granberg and Parkinson, an assessment of external assistance to Botswana
requires to take particular account of the creative role which Botswana has played
in helping to establish a system in Southern Africa conducive to international
co-operation. (The authors are here in particular referring to SADC) (1988: 135).
It is further evident that Botswana's dependence on South Africa was an important
rationale behind the Botswana governments effort to seek outside assistanee to
assist its development efforts:
"Indeed, it was the compelling need to mobilise substantial external resources to
complement her own development actions which provided an early stimulus to
Botswana's emergence on the international scene. In the world at large the new
government had to develop an effective and responsive network of co-operating
partners to reduce her dependence on South Africa for material resources and skilled
personneI." (ibid. 135).
In the 1970's aid flows both increased and diversified sigiiificantly. In 1971,
Sweden was the first major bilateral donor, after the United Kingdom, to commit
itself to support Botswana with aregular annual aid programme. In 1973 a similar
agreement was reached with Norway (Norad). According to DAC-statistics,
bilateral assistance averaged USD 80 millon in the 1980s (Table 3).
Approximately 80 to 90 per cent of the bilateral aid is received from five
countries: Germany (formerly the Federal Republie of Germany), Norway,
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. In addition to offcial
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development assistance, Botswana has received grants from variety of sources
estimated to be of an annual order of USD 5 millon (Granberg and Parkinson
1988: 138). Amongst the NGOs, the Lutheran World Federation, the Organisation
of Netherlands Volunteers, the US Peace Corps and the Danish Volunteer Service
have contributed considerable sums (ibid.).
Box 6: The rote of the Scaodinavian dooon
By 1973 Botswana no longer required grants from Britan to balance its recurrent budget
and Botswana's government proclaimed its intention to shift from an emphasis on
development of the uran sector to rural development. Scandinavian assistace, mainly by
Sweden and Norway, has ben regarded as paricularly facilitative for this purose. The
pragmatic atttudes and policies of untied aid made the Scandinavian donors more useful
and flexible than any of the major donors institutions as they normal ly tied aid to the
purchase of products produced in the donor countr (Molutsi 1993: 55). Furermore. the
flexibilty of the Scandinavian donors, as oppose to Britan who refued the recipient
countr to car forward unspent funding from one yea to another. made it natural for
Botswana's government to approach the Scandinavian donors with rural projects as
implementation slippage Was usually greatest and the rate of project expenditure harder to
predict, argues Stevens:
"All developing countres suffer from shortge of administrative capacity in one form or
another and one of the surst ways of wasting precious management taent is to allocate
priori ty projects to the wrong donors. SIDA's and NORAD's procedures were suffciently
flexible for this not to be a problem" (Stevens. 1981: 162-163)
The faet that both Norway and Sweden indicated strong preferences for rural
projects expected to benefit the lower income groups also contrbuted to the
fact that these two donors became major parners of Botswana government in
terms of rural development (Stevens 1981. Granberg and Parkinson 1988).
Sweden began providing aid to Botswana as early as 1967 and was the second major
bilateral donor, aftr the United Kingdom to establish aregular aid programe in 1971.
NORAD established a countr programe with Botswana in 1973. The objectives of
Swedish and Norwegian development aid were similar in terms of povert alleviation and
providing support for SADC. Sweden's assistace has been concentrated in five major
sectors: education. rural vilage water supply, small scale iiidustr development and district
development, and until 1993. reducing dependence on South Afrca. Following Botswana's
policy to encourage donors to concentrate on specific sectors, SIDA has speialised in rural
vilage water supply. NORAD has been one of the leading donors to Botswana with
technical assistance representing about one third of the tota aid programme. Similar to
Swedish aid. Norwegian support has been direted at rural development focusing on rural
transport and rural health centres, vilage welfare and special aid to marginalised
communities such as the Remote Area Development Programme (RAD). Following the
policy guidance of speialising in one sector, Norwegian aid has been concentrated on the
health sec tor. After a comprehensive review in 1988 (Gran berg and Parkinson), NORADs
aid to Botswana shifted from capital aid to capacity strengthening for government
institutions and support for self help effort by women and the por. Unlike many other
bilateral donors. NORAD is not intending to phase out its development to Botswana in the
near future. A new health agreement involving a number of Norwegian and Botswana
institutions has recently been signed and an intention to increase the number of volunteers
is currently being discussed.
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Loans from multilateral sources have provided an other important source of
finance, such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank and
investment institutions like the European Investment Bank and the
Commonwealth Development Corporation. The major sectors receiving assistance
have been human resource development, transportation, agriculture and
emergency food relief.
4.1.4 A Western bias
The offcial DAC statistics compiled in Table 3 indicate that while Botswana
moved from one to many donors in the 1970s, the bilateral donors have been
relatively few, predictable and relatively 'like-minded', in terms of ideology and
aid policies. This provides a contrast to many other sub-Saharan African countries
which have received aid from a wide variety of donors of various ideological
bases, such as the former socialist Eastern European countries.
A number of commentators have argued that Botswana's commtment to an
essentially free market economy made the government consciously approach the
advanced industrialised countries of Scandinavia, Western Europe and North
America as they were considered to be the most compatible parners in her efforts
to decreased her traditional dependenee (Granberg and Parkinson 1988, Stevens
1981, Hopkin 1994, Harvey and Lewis 1990). Botswana's abilty to diversify their
foreign assistance is also shown by the fact that by the early 1989 no one donor
provided more than 20 per cent of aid inflows and more than 10 donors were
providing significant amounts.
4.2 Botswana's management offoreign assistance
4.2.1 Integration
Aid resources received by the Government of Botswana have been centrally
managed and integrated into the overall national development planning- and the
budgeting process (Matambo 1991, Hopkin 1994). Subsequently, the
implementation process of the National Development Plan is regarded as
paramount in the management of aid resources. The main responsibilty for
securing, co-ordinating and monitoring external assistance is located within the
Ministr of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP).
Botswana is also credited with having maintained aremarkable continuity among
the MFDP personnel dealing regularly with donors (Granberg and Parkinson
1988). By integrating foreign aid within its overall development budgets, the
Governments own contribution to the projected recurrent costs of the
development programme are spelt out in the in the national development plan.
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The abilty of the Botswana government to present potential donors with
programe agendas and projects already in the development plan has been
regarded to have increased the Botswana governments level of ownership of the-
various donor financed projects, according to the commentators:
"In utilsing the aid offered it (Botswana) has demonstrated the determination to
incorporate it into its own development plans, thereby ensuring that both the
deployment of the aid and the outcomes are owned by Botswana" (Hopkin 1994:
397).
4.2.2 Foreign personnel in line-positions
Another, comparatively speakng, unusual factor regarding recipient donor
relationships is the fact that Botswana until recently required that all foreign
technical personnel occupy established line-positions in the ministries. Despite
frequent concerns from donor agencies about lack of counterpar positions (ibid.),
the Botswana government has enforced this policy in order to pre vent the creation
of local posts just for a particular project and to ensure that foreign technical
experts have been subject to the authority of the deparments they served. The
government has also resisted donor demands for local counterpars to be provided
for all the technical personnel due to the general manpower shortage (Granberg
and Parkinson 1988).
4.2.3 Negotiation skUls
The Government of Botswana's negotiating skills in terms of dealing with various
donor agencies is strongly emphasised in the literature (Stevens 1981, Matambo
1991, Harvey 1992). An important factor here is the fact that a donor consultative
group for Botswana has never be en established as Botswana has continued to deal
with her donors on an individual basis and not through roundtable discussions.
According to Ken Matambo, Permanent Seeretar in the MFDP, one of the main
successes of Botswana's relationship with her donors has been her individual
knowledge of the various donors and donor preferences and based on this
knowledge, the Botswana government has matched the various donors with
appropriate development proposals (Matambo 1991: 145). The government is
further regarded to be assertive in negotiating with donors, and has been known to
refuse aid if it does not coincide with government principles (Hopkin 1994).
While the governments relative leverage with donors is also ascribed to its relative
economic strength, the negotiating skills described above is also emphasised as a
key explanatory factor ofleverage (Hopkin 1994, Raphaeli 1984 et aL., Harey and
Lewis 1990).
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4.3 Why did Botswana receive so much?
fAccording to accounts presented in Table 3 total net receipts of international aid
and concessional loans to Botswana peaked at USD 219 million in 1987, which
amounted to the highest per capita aid level in the world at the time. With 1.4
million inhabitants, Botswana has benefited from the small country effect which
parly explains this factor (Mosley 1986).
Despite the economic growth experienced, the amount of aid received as grants
has throughout the period of independence exceeded or equalled the amounts
received as concessional loans. One factor explaining this is that - technical
assistance which have constituted a major element of Botswana's aid assistance,
have tended to be given as grants (Granberg and Parkinson 1988). The reasons
that attracted the donors to Botswana after independence were several.
4.3.1 Economic potential
The fact that Botswana was a very poor country at the time of independence made
the country eligible for bilateral assistance from a number of countries, such as the
Scandinavian, which had stated a policy of giving aid to the poorest countries.
However, unlike other low income countries, once the mineral possibilties were
perceived, with the Shashe project, Botswana also promised the prospects of rapid
growth. This provided potential donors with two stimuli, namely to paricipate in
the creation of social- as well as admnistrative and physical infrastrueture that
would be even more necessary as mineral growth accelerated, and further, the
economic growth made it likely that Botswana would be able to maintain the
schools and c1inics that donor money made possible (Stevens 1981: 167).
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Table 3.2: Botswana: Total receipts of international aid 1989.1993
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4.4 The effect of apartheid
Botswana's proclaimed non-racial democracy in the con text of a trouble torn
Southern Africa initially earned the country a good name and sympathy from the
international donor community. According to Molutsi (1993:52), Botswana's
choice of a non-racial, multipar democracy in the context of a racially troubled
Southern Africa in the 1960s was viewed with considerable sympathy by the
international community. As a res ult, Botswana made full advantage of their
geopolitical situation to project their country as a democratie experiment on the
doorsteps of apartheid (Somolekae 1989).
Generally, it is argued that by upholding the democratic system as a front-line
state of aparheid ruled South Africa and when most of neighbouring states
abandoned multiparty rule for various varieties of one par or militar rule,
Botswana became the showcase of Africa and as aresult received much aid and
attention (Stevens 1981, Molutsi 1992, Holm and Molutsi 1992).
4.4.1 Bonus for achievement
Evaluation reports, country studies and various academic artic1es consulted have
characterised Botswana's management and utilisation of aid resources as overall
very positive. It has been argued that the successful implementation and utilisation
of aid resources may have been a contributing factor in increasing Botswana's total
aid flows.
According to Hopkin (1994), the characteristics of the Botswana civil service and
its propensity to play by the rules, without corruption are major reasons why
donors were attracted to Botswana. The capacity to identify priority areas and to
implement aid into comprehensive development projects thereby encouraging
collaboration among donors in stead of senseless competition for viable projects,
further added to the attraction of Botswana (Hopkin 1994: 399-400). It has been
argued that the ability to design effective development plans, matched by a
capacity to implement projects, made Botswana unusual for a country at such an
early stage of development.
According to Stevens: "Botswana's ability not only to spend fully the amounts
available....but to absorb at short notice supplementar allocations, resulted in
additional aid, an affect that has not been fully appreciated" (1981:176). The Vice
President of Botswana, Festus Mogae, has explained the efficiency factor in more
direct terms when commenting on the high levels of aid: "many donors have
favoured the country because we were able to spend resources both effectively and
speedily. That meant that we normally got something extra" (Horner 1995: 20).
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4.5 The relative importance of aid
Statistics give evidence to the fact that Botswana has received substantial amounts
of aid. The literature consulted has indicated that the aid finances received have
been utilsed effectively and in line with Botswana's own development objectives
and plans. What then, has been the impact of 30 years of international assistance
both in terms of financial flows, and the large influx of manpower? In short, what
can be determined about the role of aid in Botswana's development according to
the literature?
When aiming to analyse the impact of aid to Botswana's overall development
performance, it is crucial to emphasise that even though aid was a determinant
macro economic feature in the first years after independence, aid only constituted
5 per cent of GNP in 1971 and peaked at 8 per cent of GNP in 1987 (World
Development Report 1990). The figure becomes significant when compared to
other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the latest figures from 1993,
aid had dropped to 3.3 per cent of GNP in Botswana, while the comparative figure
for Mozambique was as high as 79.2 per cent, Tanzania 40 per cent and Kenya
16.1 per cent.
It should also be noted that whereas the per cent age of aid is dec1ining in
Botswana, it is rising in most other sub-Saharan countries (World Development
Report 1995). Granberg and Parkinson estimate that the total inflow of capital,
aid, loans and capital, including large private investments not related to offcial
donor institutions, was roughly equivalent to one quarer of the aDP of Botswana
at its peak (1988: 138).
The quotes presented here underscore that aid, while high in per capita levels,
never has dominated the Botswana economy. Aid utilisation as a percentage of
public sector development spending fell from a total dependency (100%) in
1967-1970 (Stevens 1981: 175) to between 40 and 60 % from the late 1970s to
less than 15% in 1992 (World Development Report 1994). As a result of the
overall economic changes takng place in Botswana in the last few decades, aid
and its functions, have also changed from in the early years to provide an input
towards relaxation of macro-economic constraints and constituting the majority of
the government developing budget, to the present role of aid having as its main
function to ease bottleneeks and policy reforms at the sectoral leve! (Granberg and
Parkinson 1988).
4.6 Impacts of aid
Based on the literature evaluating the impact of aid to Botswana, the main results
can be presented under three main headings:
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Financial assistance through grants and concessional loans is regarded to have
been an important contribution to economic growth achieved in the initial
stages of Botswana's development proeess.
Official aid has contributed to better income distribution. Within this
perspective, it is argued that aid has contributed to political stabil it Y .
Through financing of technical assistance, foreign aid is regarded to have
reduced the negative effects of Botswana's shortage of skilled manpower
4.6.1 Aid and economic growth
During the early period of Botswana's development after independence, foreign
assistance played a significant role. Most commentators argue that the inability of
Botswana to attraet private capital at independence and legitimate fear of being
dominated by South Africa necessitated the resort to aid (Hopkin 1994, Maipose
et aL. 1995). Thus, according to the literature, international visibility and
legitimacy can be seen as vital 'side benefits' of increased levels of aid in the early
1970s. According to a number of commentators, Botswana's development would
not have been possible without the contribution of foreign aid for the basic
physical and social infrastrueture, which in turn made economic growth possible,
was paid almost entirely by foreign aid after independence. (Granberg and
Parkinson, 1988, Harvey and Lewis 1990, Raphaeli 1984, Stevens 1981, UNDP
1989). With regard to the question of whether international finance capital could
have contributed the same amounts, Botswana's initial marginality as a poor,
landlocked country, indeed almost a province of South Africa, is emphasised.
However, even at the current leve! of Botswana's development, aid resources are
regarded to have a economic impact as aid has relieved the budget of expenditure
that would otherwise have been met from government revenues. As aresult, aid
has contributed to increased budget surpluses and foreign reserves, according to
Granberg and Parkinson (1988: 141). The effect is not insignificant, and although
donors may feel ambivalent about contributing, even indirectly, to financial
surpluses, commentators have argued that the current budgetar and currency
reserves may prove critical in helping Botswana cope with economic transition
(ibid., Hope 1995).
4.6.2 Aid redressing inequality and providing political stability
According to Molutsi the impact of aid becomes c1earer when assessed in terms of
the sectors that received it (1993: 54). Molutsi argues that offcial foreign aid has
been a major contributor to better income distribution in Botswana as aid has
focused on sectors tending to benefit the rural and urban poor as large proportion
of aid funds went into provisions of social services, inc1uding education and
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training, health services, water supply and physical infrastrueture in rural areas
(ibid. 55). The fact that aid played an important role in finaneing much of the
basic social infrastructure, both rural and urban, paricularly in the first two
decades after independence, is stressed by a number of commentators (Hopkin
1994, Hope 1995, Molutsi 1993).
It is also argued in the literature that aid finances have increased the
implementation capacity of the government of Botswana. Evaluating the impact of
aid to Botswana's overall development, Granberg and Parkinson argue that
although Botswana has astrong balanee of payments and thus the purely financial
aspect of foreign assistanee presently is of less importanee in Botswana today, the
increased resources have encouraged Botswana to undertake a development
programe far larger than the government would be prepared to do without this
support. Based on this, Granberg and Parkinson argue that foreign assistance has
faciltated the governments task in allocating resources to the poor, in paricular to
those in rural areas:
"Byeasing financial constraints on development, aid availabilty has made it
possible for the government to release resources, without feeling that this would
seriously impair the growth of production elsewhere in the economy" (Granberg and
Parkinson 1988: 141).
The views expressed by Granberg and Parkinson seem to correspond with the
argument made by Picard (1987), Holm and Molutsi (1992) and Charlton (1991)
that rural development and poverty alleviation has been secondary objectives for
Government of Botswana compared to economic growth.
The fact that large proportions of development aid has been directed to lower
income groups, and particularly to rural areas, has lead commentators to argue that
one of the main impacts of development aid has been to contribute to political
stability in Botswana through the continued rule of the BDP (Chambers 1973, Du
Toit 1995, Holm and Molutsi 1992, Somolekae 1989). The basic argument
presented by the scholars referred to here is that the governing pary, through
donor funding, has been able to provide noticeable development to vilages and
rural areas which again has yielded electoral success to BDP in general election.
Based on this argument, it is be hel d that foreign aid has contributed to political
stability and legitimacy of the political system, and in particular, the continued
rule of BDP. The only empirical study referred to in the literature to support this
view relates to the implementation of the Accelerated Rural Development
Programme in 1973 (ARDP, see Box 7).
Linked to the debate on how aid has impacted on the actual political system and
policy debate in Botswana, the literature is very insubstantiaL. Molutsi is one of
very few commentators addressing this issue and he argues that:
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"Overall, ( )the international pressure, the pressure groups and organisations have
done and said things that local people would not have done or said. They have in this
way acted as watch dogs for Botswana's democracy. fillng the gap left by local
interest groups, which are stil weak and at the earl y stages of development" (Molutsi
1993: 59).
Box 7: Politicalegtimacy through foreign aid: The cae of ARDP
Chambers argues that the Government of Botswana has given high priority to rural
development as a means of redressing inequalities and seure political stability
since Botswana achieved budgeta self suffciency in 1973 (1977). Linking this
policy shift to the initiation of the Accelerated Rural Development Programme
(ARDP) . he claims that :
"A sense of opportunity and urgency was enhanced by the general
awarness that the government had not yet ben able to achieve
dramatic, tagible results in most of the rural area where the great
majority of the people lived and by the stey approach of the date in
October 1974 when the electorate would pas a verdict on the
governments performance. The ARDP, resulting from a Cabinet
decision in November 1973. was a logical outcome" (1977: xi)
Du Toit argues that the decision to introduce ARDP. estimated to cost of 21 milion
Pula, representing two and a half times the tota rual investment made by the state
from the beginning of 1960 to 1972. was related to the election results in i 969. In
an election campaign, where the backlog of rual infrastrcture was emphasised
Chief Bathoen Il. chose to challenge the BDP government. Representing the main
opposition par (BNF the chief defeated vice president Quett Masire in the bid for
a paramentar seat (1995: 55). As the primar objective of ARDP was that the
projects should be visible on the ground vilage roads. primar schools, vilage
water supplies, rural health posts and clinics and rural administration buildings
were given priority (Bhyiyan 1987: 97-98. 137, Colclough and McCarhy:
231-234). The plan yielded a favourable election result as in the 1974 election BDP
regained the ground it had lost to opposition paries in 1969. winning back three
seat in the National Assembly and raising its average percentage of the votes from
69.9 to 77.7 (Du Toit 1995: 55).
The impact of foreign aid on rural development. and thus. possibly to the
strengthened legitimacy of the BDPgovernment. is ilustrated by the fact that ARDP
was over 44% financed by Swedish and Norwegian aid (Molutsi 1993: 55,
Colclough and McCary 1980: 233). However, the ARDP had effects beyond the
electoral gain by the government. According to Jones. ARDP indicated the
governments commitment to rural development but more importantly, it
demonstrated to the donors, whose programmes were just beginning that a capacity
existed for the design and execution of rural projects. not only at central
government level. but also in the district councils (Jones 1977: l23-5. Stevens
198 i). Furthermore. ARD P was a very importnt 'testing ground' for the Botswana
government in terms of matching donors with appropriate projects (Stevens 1981).
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4.6.3 Development through technical co-operation - the positive
view
The shortage of skilled personnel was severe in Botswana at independence and the
rapid expansion of physical and social infrastructure fuelled by economic growth
created even greater demands for skilled manpower. It is evident, based on the
literature consulted, that the international community has played a critical role in
relieving this constraint through the provision of technical co-operation and
training.
According to Du Toit, astriking feature in the institutional expansion after
independence in Botswana has been the extent to which the colonial pattern of
expatriates holding crucial positions endured (1995: 33). Pigures provided by
Raphaeli et aL., indicate that the number of expatriates in central government
decreased in terms of per centage from 31 in 1966 to 9 in 1975, but the actual
number of expatriates remained almost intact (1984: 43-44). In the professional
and technical categories expatriate presenee remained marked at 51 and 29 per
cent respectively (ibid.).
Technical co-operation with mixed accomplishment in general, stands out as a
success in Botswana, as expatriate staff has acted as upholders of technical
standards and efficiency, according to a World Bank evaluation (Raphaeli 1984:
39). While the impact of foreign technical personnel is diffcult to measure,
Granberg and Parkinson seconds the assessments of the World Bank team and
conc1udes that overall, the most important contribution of foreign aid has been to
relieve, although not eliminate, the shortage of skilled and professional manpower
in Botswana. "The benefits of this has been far greater than the costs involved, for
it has brought into use resources that would otherwise have remained idle" (1988:
141).
The main reason why technical co-operation is regarded to have been successful in
Botswana is related to the fact that the technical co-operation component is
included in national development planning and manpower budgeting. This again
has meant that expatriate staff supplied from technical co-operation funds are
integrated into the structure of the civil service, greatly facilitating co-ordination
and centralising of planning and administration of Technical Assistance (Raphaeli
1984). Du Toit argues that the impact of expatriates in public sec tor is not only
decided by share numbers but also the strategic placement. Linked to the argument
above about foreign assistance having contributed to political stabilty, du Toit
agues that the expatriate sector of the public work-force contributed a vital
ingredient to the quality and autonomy of statehood that evolved in post
independence Botswana (1995: 58-59).
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Related to the point made by du Toit, a number of commentators have in general
pointed to the intellectual impact that 30 years of exceedingly high levels of
expatriate personnel and foreign assistance has had on the system of govemanee
and bureaucracy (Granberg and Parkinson 1988, Raphaeli 1984, Stevens 1981,
Harvey and Lewis 1990, Hopkin 1994) More concretely, although stil not
substantiated by actual empirical analysis, Stevens (1981) makes an interesting
remark relating the level of technical assistance to Botswana's overall success in
terms of negotiating with outside powers:
"Perhaps most important of all, the government would not have been able to play
such a calculated hand in its dealings with the mining companies, and the level of
revenues would have been less" (Stevens 1981:174).
One of the few detailed analysis of the impact of expatriate staff is related to the
policy-makng proeess that produced the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP). The
study by Picard revealed that concern with matters of equity was more pronounced
in the ranks of expatriate civil servants than among others (1980).
4.6.4 Development through technical co-operation - the negative
view
The effects of foreign personneI on state development have, however, not been
regarded as positive by all analysts: Molutsi finds that : "In a country where the
political has become subservient to the technocratic-bureaucratic sphere,
expatriate influence on policy formulation and on the development agenda has
been overwhelming" (Molutsi 1993: 58). The demonstration effects of high
standard of living for expatriates, and the costs implied in terms of
accommodating their demands, is an other negative effects remarked in the
literature (Hopkin 1994). It is further argued that loss of continuity meant that
technical and administrative approaches devised were way out of proportionlscale
with the supply of indigenous technical and administrative resources (Hope 1995).
The conc1usion by Stevens, however, seem to cover the main position in the
literature when he argues that: "there can be liule questioning that the overall
impact of foreign assistance in Botswana has been a beneficialone" (Stevens:
175).
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5 Aid and development: is there a
connection?
5.1 What is in the Uterature?
5.1.1 An additional source of finance
The main conclusion appearing in the literature on the impact of aid in Botswana
is how closely the aid funds have been tied to the Botswana govemments own
development plans and policies. By incorporating development aid funds into its
own development plans the government of Botswana has ensured that both the
deployment of aid and the outcomes are owned by Botswana. Aid has helped
Botswana getting where it is, only a bit faster, as some commentators say. From a
financial point of view, therefore, we can concluded that the linkages between the
development record of Botswana as presented in Chapter 2, and the role of aid are
very strong.
5.1.2 In a virtuous circle
The tentative conclusion that can be drawn from the literature revíew is that sound
economic management and political stability create conditions for further
economic and political development. The linkages found may therefore suggest
that development aid fosters development when it contributes to an already
functioning political system. Aid cannot in itself create such a virtuous circle of
development.
In Botswana such a virtuous circle has been created by the integration of aid into a
centralised national planning and budgeting system which has proved very
effective in Botswana's aid management. Through ownership of the various aid
programmes initiated, achieved in parts through the good negotiating skills and
economic leverage created by a growing economy, Botswana has been able to
utilise aid resources in government determined development strategies. Both with
regard to Botswana's development record and its utilisation of finances from
foreign aid, the literature review has indicated that good management more than
good fortune has been the defining factor.
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5.1.3 But is there a direct effect?
The fact that aid in macro economic terms is less significant in Botswana than in
many other developing nations may explain the lack of significance attributed to
aid in the socio-economic literature. However, it is evident that the impact of aid
in the initial stages of the development proeess, when Botswana was poor and
marginal in terms of attracting international finance, was significant.
Furthermore, the literature review has indicated that the impactof aid in terms of
sectoral contributions and relieving personnel shortages through man-power influx
and training has been far greater than the percentage of GDP would indicate.
While these factors are reflected in much of the literature consulted, with few
exceptions, they are not substantiated by empirical data and research.
However, despite the fact that Botswana continuously has received foreign aid
from a variety of multi- and bilateral sources over the last 30 years which is
regarded to have contributed to the country's overall impressive development
record, it may be surprising that so few direct linkages between aid and
development appear in the literature. In the voluminous socio-economic literature
describing Botswana's economic development history, the role of international aid
is referred to only occasionally and few attempts have been made to integrate the
contributions of aid to the analyses of Botswana's economic development in
general.
Likewise, compared to the voluminous literature discussing Botswana's political
system, bureaucracy and economic policies, we found surprisingly few analyses on
the role of aid. Furthermore, the references found linking aid to Botswana's
development per se were only occasionally based on empirical analyses.
Our more sporadic selection of evaluation reports, country studies and various
donor or Botswana initiated analyses of individual development programmes,
however, indicated that a substantial amount of so called "grey material" exist
describing the role of aid, but again, this is not related to the development proeess
in general.
5.2 Identification of gaps in the IIterature
In view of the rather voluminous literature on Botswana, considering the size and
relative marginality of the countr, somewhat surprisingly we fin d that the
interesting tales of Botswana's developing history reviewed in fact fail to provide
us with adequate answers to a number of issues regarding the role of aid.
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5.2.1 The impact of aid on macro-economic management
While the literature reviewed has indicated that foreign aid has facilitated lon g
term planning in Botswana, information regarding the terms of conditions of aid
received during the last 30 years is not compiled and presented for a wider
audience. Similarly, detailed knowledge of the sectoral distribution of aid, the
various donors and exactly how international aid is integrated into the national
development plans is not specified in any study.
Policies, procedures and models for macro-economic management and national
development planning were hardly in place at the time of independence. The
intellectual contribution through aid, and the role of aid in the continuous
institutionalisation of these systems, have not been properly researched.
5.2.2 The impact oftechnical co-operation
All studies consulted have given emphasis to the large number of foreign
personnel present in Botswana and the country's reliance upon technical assistance
throughout the period of independence. Yet, to what extent has technical
assistance contributed to the structure and culture of the Botswana civil service?
How has aid administrators been received and how have they functioned in local
communities? To what extent did foreign experts guide and influence the strategic
choices made by Botswana authorities in negotiations with international partners,
such as South Africa over the SACU agreement and De Beers over shares of
diamond revenues? Or generally speakng, why has technical assistance,
seemingly, been more successful in Botswana than other countries in the region?
5.2.3 The impact on human resource development
Human resources development has throughout the independence period remained
the area receiving most external assistance. Yet, at present few studies have
attempted to assess the impact of this form of development assistance in terms of
the quality and quantity of the training programmes. To what extent can the
manpower policies employed by the Botswana authorities explain the limited
amount of brain-drain experienced? To what extent has the reliance on technical
co-operation contributed to the training of Botswana personnel?
5.2.4 The impact on rural areas
The literature review has further revealed that aid has been a significant factor in
terms of financing Botswana's rural development programmes as well as in sectors
affecting the living standards of the urban poor. But the literature has not provided
us with answers to the question of whether foreign aid contributed to rural
development in terms of employment opportunities in the rural areas. Household
42
statistics presented give evidence to a skewed income distribution in Botswana
and also the existence of a significant poverty-problem. To what extent has the
development aid contributed to poverty alleviation? Furthermore, are the rural
development strategies chosen a reflection of Botswana's own development goals
or of donor interest and design? Is it possible through an analysis of aid and rural
development policies after independence to substantiate the claim that foreign aid
has provided political legitimacy to the party in government through investments
in rural development schemes?
5.2.5 Gaps of comparative knowledge
Botswana has been included in a number of comparative studies under thematic
headings pertaining to the system of government, institutional capacity, civil
service reform and economic policies (Diamond et al. 1989, Bratton and Hyden
1992, Picard and Garity 1994, Blomström and Lundahl 1993, Cohen and
Goulbourne 1991, Colclough and Manor 1991). However, Botswana's aid
relations have rarely been discussed in a comparative perspective.
The literature study has revealed that the integration of aid to its overall
development plans has been regarded as a major ingredient in Botswana's
successful development record. However, other countries have attempted to
establish similar integrated aid management and budgetar systems without
succeeding. This suggests that appropriate structures alone are not sufficient, the
political, institutional and economic context must be conducive to effective
management of aid. Unlike most other African countries, aid represents a small
portion of the government budget and is hardly significant in macro economic
terms. Can it be argued that the fact that aid contributes rather than dominates the
macro economic policies is a key explanatory factor for Botswana's success?
In the growing international debate on limits to aid and aid dependency, Botswana
represents a case of particular importance. Can nations bein g at the threshold of
booming aid relationships, develop strategies which minimise the risks of "aid
disease"? We wil argue that the experiences of Botswana may provide a number
of lessons for other developing nations, and maybe in particular for some of the
new democracies in Southern Africa who are about to receive a substantial influx
of aid funding and donors in the near future. The literature study has revealed that
good management and strategic planning more than good fortune has defined
Botswana's economic development and effective use of aid. Furthermore,
Botswana was stil poor in terms of financial and human resources in the first
decade after independence when the country initially established its relationship
with a wide diversity of donors.
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5.3 From gaps to hypothesis: Aid and capacity for change
Mainly as result of its successful development record, donor agencies are reducing
or even phasing out their assistance to Botswana. While the Botswana government
argue that they are being punished for success, it is evident that Botswana has
reached the end of an era. In 30 years Botswana has moved from a dismal start as
one of the 10 poorest countries in the world to a stage where aid is no longer a
vital component of its developing spending. And it is general ly accepted that
Botswana financially can do without aid. But given other important impacts of aid,
some commentators find the reduction of aid to be premature (Horner 1995,
Hopkin 1994). It may therefore be argued that role of aid in relation to Botswana's
development proeess is insufficiently understood.
The main challenge to Botswana is change. The need to diversify a mining
dominated economy has been pOÍnted to. Yet, development of the private sector
has be en slow. The size of the Botswana government is large even in an African
context. There are report of declining performanee of the Botswana development
machinery, marked by higher levels of corrption (Good 1994), and an
overextended public sec tor with falling investments and lower returns of
investments (Hermans 1993). The challenge of moving from quantity to quality in
social service provision needs to be addressed in the near future. The growing
opposition and rising unemployment levels may testify towards a changing future
scenario in terms of political stability and low levels of social conflct.
The question of whether the Botswana state has capacity in terms of handling the
economic and political challenges ahead, highlights the question of the impact of
aid and the future role of aid and funding agencies. Based on the gaps in
knowledge identified above, a further analysis may take as a point of departure:
Has aid enabled the Botswana state to enhance its jlexibility and capacity
in dealing with future economic challenges ?
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